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BOOK REVIEWS
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, PART IV. By I. L. Sharfman.
New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1937. Pp. xiv, 550.
The text of this concluding volume of Professor Sharfman's monumental
study of the nation's outstanding regulatory body is devoted to a discussion
of the Interstate Commerce Commission's organization and procedure and
to a conclusion which summarizes the author's views as developed in the
project as a whole. Only 388 pages are devoted to text, the remainder being
occupied by an index and table of cases for the volume and by a consolidated
index and table of cases.
Except in his conclusion, Professor Sharfman, in this volume, remains
in the fields of law and administration and does not enter that of the
economist, which is his own particular province. Substantive policies are
not discussed in the body of Part IV. It is significant that this entire
"study in administrative law and procedure," under the auspices of the
Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth Fund, should have been
undertaken by an economist whose interest, presumably, lay principally in
the policies evolved by the Commission. These have been dealt with previ-
ously in Part III.1 But it was obviously impossible for the Commonwealth
Fund to appraise procedure except in terms of the results to which it led
or for Professor Sharfman to examine the working of economic policy in
railroad regulation without understanding the mechanism through which it
was being effectuated. Hence of necessity, one assimes, discipline were
merged in making the study, as they must be in any attempt to understand
the phenomena of the Great Society.
Professor Sharfman moves with a sure step from issues of organizational
efficiency to questions of the value and demands of quasi-judicial procedure
and back again. He is fully aware of the need both for effectuating public
policy and for protecting private interest, as well as of the respective roles
of Congress, Commission, and courts in carrying administration forward.
He does not undertake to analyze exhaustively such matters as the extent
to which the Commission has barred evidence as unreliable or irrelevant,
nor does he examine the question of the extent to which the Commission
has relied upon its own previous decisions and utterances in deciding cases.
The latter task has been interestingly performed elsewhere, together with
others which descend farther into the realm of practice than it is necessary
for Professor Sharfman to go.2 On the evidence point it suffices for him
to outline the limitations imposed by Supreme Court decisions3 and to illus-
trate the manner in which the Commission, while freed from the rules of
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, has performed its duty "to ob-
1. Book Reviews (1935) 20 ST. LouIs LAW REviEW 293; (1937) 22 WASH-
INGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 300. The previous volumes of Professor Sharf-
man's study are noticed in (1935) 20 ST. LOUIS LAW Ruviuw 189.
2. Interstate Commerce Commission Semi-Centennial Commemorative Is-
sue (1937) 5 G. Wash. L. Rev. no. 3.
3. Pp. 201-211.
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serve all requirements essential to the development of pertinent and trust-
worthy information."4 In similar illustrative manner the author presents
a clear exposition of such matters as the interest which entitles parties to
appear before the Commission, the pleadings (if they may be called that)
which the Commission requires in its several varieties of procedure, and
the character of hearings afforded. Statutory provisions, the practice of
the Commission, and judicially imposed limitations are skillfully related to
each other.
In Professor Sharfman's discussion two especially important points stand
out. These are, first, the terrific load of work which the Commission has
managed to carry and, second, the flexibility of the arrangements whereby
its accomplishment has been made possible. In 1927-8 the Commission acted
formally upon 20,553 matters, 4917 of which, including 1829 "reports," or
cases, involved the exercise of discretion.5 Many of even the discretionary
matters were acted upon by divisions or by single Commissioners, but an
average of more than six Commissioners acted upon each of the 4917 such
matters. Since there are eleven Commissioners, each of them had on an
average to pass upon 2829 such questions during the year. In addition each
Commissioner spent all or part of not less than 100 working days in hear-
ings, travelled to and from hearings held outside Washington, participated
in disposing of the routine decisions, and gave direction to the work of
one or more of the Commission's administrative bureaus.
Such a record of performance is a tribute not only to the ability and
devotion which, on the whole, the Government has commanded from this
group of officials but also to the administrative methods which they have
been enabled to employ. Not only has the Commission's staff served the
members with efficiency and accuracy but, with a minimum of control by
mandatory provisions of statutes, the Commission, unlike the courts, has
been empowered to adopt extensive delegation of functions to divisions,
individual commissioners, and committees of employees( and, in addition,
to evolve four distinct, abbreviated modes of procedure besides the formal
procedure involving hearings.7 Always, however, the consent of the parties
has been required to dispense with the more formal methods, and the possi-
bility of ultimate review by the entire Commission has been preserved.
Thus the Commission has fulfilled in actuality the responsibility with which
it has been legally charged. Even stipulations and compromises have been
carefully examined for the purpose of testing their conformity to the
statutes,8 for the Commission is administering an Act and not merely
deciding cases.9 Thus the administrative process as developed by the Com-
mission has resulted in "sound and realistic adjustment of complex rela-
tionships in the public interest" and "through the employment of quasi-
4. Pp. 212-220.
5. P. 293.
6. P. 58 ff.
7. Pp. 170 if., 221 if.
8. Pp. 173, 197.
9. Compare the somewhat sad results of consent decrees under the anti-
trust acts.
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judicial methods * * * has flexibly but successfully safeguarded all essen-
tial private rights."'0
The utility of judicial review comes in for its share of recognition at
Professor Sharfman's hands. Although that review has been exercised with
restraint, it has been "an effective bulwark against abuse of administrative
power."' " And the Commission has "consistently accepted" court decisions
"as authoritative guides to future action" and thus has developed its powers
"as an organic expression of the legal structure as a whole. '12 In the
Atchison Railway case'8 the Supreme Court "imposed a salutary check
upon the subversive possibilities" of the Commission's "striking departure
from its usual meticulous regard for the basic rights of the parties. ' '14
The author makes no mention of possible undue extension of judicial re-
view by reason of the dictum in the recent Baltimore and Ohio case,15
whereby the district courts are empowered under some circumstances to
receive additional evidence in injunction proceedings against the Commis-
sion's orders.
Professor Sharfman has both objections and suggestions in regard to
the reorganization of the Commission and the reform of its work. Al-
though he advocates greater boldness by the Commission in imposing rate
reductions for the purpose of stimulating traffic and of scaling down capital
obligations,' 6 he questions the wisdom of introducing a permanent Coordi-
nator of Transportation into the regulatory picture for the purpose of
planning and promoting improved methods in the industry. That, he feels,
would invade too seriously the sphere of management to be justified under
a system of private ownership and public regulation. On the whole he
agrees with the Commission in opposing Commissioner Eastman's proposal
in his report as temporary Federal Coordinator, for a Control Board of
limited membership to unify the work of divisions of the Commission whose
members, except for the chairman of each division, would not participate,
as now, in the conduct of the Commission's entire affairs}7
With ample justification, Professor Sharfman abandons his usual calm
mood in castigating the proposal of the President's Committee on Admin-
istrative Management to separate the "administrative" from the "judicial"
aspects of the Commission's work, subject the former to departmental con-
trol, and insulate the latter in a judicial division which shall be only
nominally in the department. Against the background of Professor Sharf-
man's careful study and realistic appraisal, the "astonishingly sweeping and
intemperate terms" of the Committee's denunciation of the independent
commissions, including the Interstate Commerce Commission, condemn them-
10. P. 255.
11. P. 383.
12. P. 384.
13. (1932) 284 U. S. 249.
14. P. 237.
15. (1936) 298 U. S. 349. This case should be read in conjunction with
St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 38.
16. Pp. 377-378.
17. Pp. 337-340.
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selves; and the author allows them to do so by spreading them over two
pages of his book.s The crude conceptualism and ignoring of facts on
the part of the Committee in attempting to segregate "policy determination"
from "adjudication" and in its assertion of "irresponsibility" on the part
of this Commission and of others, will carry no conviction to Professor
Sharfman's readers. To the author it is clear, as it should be to those who
follow his exposition, that the "quasi-judicial methods" employed in the
performance of the Commission's regulatory functionso do not imply that
the Commission is there merely judging disputes in the light of previously
formulated policy. The policy grows as conditions arise which need to be
dealt with. Hence it is "grounded in the realities" 20 and the decisions are
"equitable in substance,"21 at the same time that regulatory policy is stable
in comparison with political control. As contrasted with these character-
istics of the present set-up, reorganization based upon dogma has little to
offer.
As the author brings out, the Commission is confronted at present with
an enormously increased load because of the addition of the function of
regulating transportation by motor vehicles. It is falling rapidly behind
in its docket in that branch of its work. Not only will new administrative
expedients have to be devised, but it is of the highest importance that ade-
quate appropriations for accounting and staff services be made. At previ-
ous periods in its history the Commission has been seriously hampered by
stringency in this respect. 22 The present situation is not promising.23 Thus,
ironically, the Commission, devotedly and efficiently rendering an essential
service to the nation, finds itself condemned in a report to the Chief Execu-
tive and inadequately supplied with funds by the people's representatives
at a time when the need for governmental planning and control is being
stressed as never before. It has, on the other hand, consistently commanded
the confidence and respect of Congress and the courts and of the commu-
nity at large. Therein must lie the reward of its members, as well as some
assurance that the demos will not fail to profit from this unique achieve-
ment in the art of government. Its counterparts, as everyone knows, are
now numerous in the land. RALPH F. FucHs.t
THE MIND OP THE JUROR. By Albert S. Osborn. Albany, New York: The
Boyd Printing Company, 1938. Pp. xv, 239.
This book, by the well known author of Questioned Documents and The
Problem of Proof, will be appreciated by all interested in the administration
of justice.
As suggested in the preface, the main interest of many pleaders "appears
18. Pp. 263-265.
19. P. 269.
20. P. 365.
21. P. 375.
22. P. 288 if.
23. P. 299.
t Professor of Law, Washington University; Fellow, Columbia University
School of Law, 1937-38.
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